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Introduction
Human capital is one of the central drivers of economic performance. A line of research dating back to the work of Lucas (1988) and Romer (1990) suggests that a more educated labour force can greatly improve a country's rate of growth. Yet, theoretical models do not provide clear insights into the way human capital actually affects economic performance (Thirlwall 2006, Todaro and Smith 2006) . Becker et al. (1990) underline the inverse relationship between fertility and human capital that is responsible for the presence of different growth equilibria across countries. This has recently become a key-feature of the Unified Growth Theory, which aim is to merge different stages of economic development in a single and comprehensive model of growth (Galor 2005) . Based on the US during the 20 th century, Goldin and Katz (2009) put forward that education is likely to supply skills that are required in order to meet the demand generated by technological progress. Other works in a historical perspective provide further insights into the way education and human capital can promote economic growth. In spite of different (and not necessarily mutually exclusive) views on the issue, improved human capital prompted by the Enlightenment might explain why the Industrial Revolution was mainly a European phenomenon (Landes 1999 , Mokyr 2004 , Mokyr 2009 Although from 16 th to the 18 th century much of the improvement in schooling and literacy was sparked by private institutions, the rise of modern states and the will to provide mass education prompted the intervention of government policy. Whether to implement a decentralized education system vis-à-vis a more centralized one became a crucial choice, because of the intrinsic tension between private demand for education and externalities brought about by the accumulation of human capital (Mitch 2013) .
Historically, different countries have reacted to a variety of economic and political factors; hence it is quite difficult to identify the circumstances under which diverse education systems succeed or fail. Go and Lindert (2010) stress that the US did well in adopting schooling via grassroots efforts, but they also admit that the mid-19 th century was characterized by the uneven rise of education across states. By the same token, Mitch (1986) claims that the education system in the United Kingdom, largely based on local incentives and tuition fees, benefited from substantial state intervention in the form of subsidies during the 19 th century -especially as far as pupils-to-teacher ratios are concerned. Along the same lines, a recent strand of research focuses on the reconstruction of routes to mass education in different world regions, towards a better understanding of the way public policy can shape schooling and human skills and, in turn, economic development (cf. Xuyi, Foldvari and Van Leween 2012 for an overview on Qing China; Go and Park 2012 for colonial Korea and Chaudhary et al. 2012 for the BRICs in the early 20 th century).
The evidence on human capital in 19 th century Italy does not depict a rosy picture. The second population census (1871) described the country's literacy rates as a "warning scream in Italy and Europe". The data, firstly published in 1861, had revealed that about 17 million people out of less than 22 million were illiterate. 1 Italy's backwardness in the 19 th century has been endorsed by comparative studies on different dimensions of the Human Development Index: as far as literacy rates are concerned, data drawn from Crafts (1997) and A'Hearn, Auria and Vecchi (2011) Although several factors might help to explain the country's scarcity of human capital, the most peculiar certainly is Italy's legacy of pre-unification states: regional data show that its performance was largely affected by regional disparities, which persisted beyond the Great War (Conte, Della Torre and Vasta 2007 , Felice 2007 , A'Hearn, Auria and Vecchi 2011 , Felice and Vasta 2012 . In fact, the convergence process remained largely incomplete in the Interwar period, in spite of the fact that literacy measures are subject to an upper-bound of 1.00 (Figure 2 ). Therefore, understanding why regional disparities in education persisted throughout time is of primary importance in order to comprehend Italy's development. The historiography has pointed out the role of public policy -and the will to maintain a decentralized education system until the early 20 th century: Zamagni blames the government for its late decision to step in, taken only after "the failure of the alternative" had become clear (Zamagni 1993) . Vasta pushes this argument forward. In his view, centralization was extremely urgent: decentralized primary schooling was not only a burden on modernisation, but also a possible constraint for long-term regional convergence given the prominent role of human capital in the Second Industrial Revolution (Vasta 1999 Vasta, shows that "convergence in education was significant in the Liberal Age mostly as a consequence of the huge differentials in 1871", but that "much more could be done" (Felice and Vasta 2012) . This claim seems to be supported by Battilani (2011) , who finds evidence of large disparities in tax revenues and public expenditure by municipalities across Italian regions after the Unification. However, these hypotheses
have not yet been tested, and the role of the country's education system in the accumulation of human capital has been under researched to a great extent. The results confirm these hypotheses. The evidence of a significant relationship between the municipalities' spending capacity and the level of schooling is proved, while the econometric results suggest that centralization fostered the supply of schooling and mitigated the relationship between school supply and the municipalities' available resources. These findings are strengthened by the fact that the amount of available resources is found to be independent from a proxy for the municipalities' political will to invest in education. However, the evidence on the pace of convergence after the Daneo-Credaro reform is mixed, and needs to be further explored. The paper is organized as follows: section (2) discusses Italy's system of primary schooling (1859 -1911) and surveys some qualitative evidence on the presence of a human capital trap; section (3) presents the methodology adopted in order to test the two hypotheses; section (4) describes the range of primary sources explored; section (5) reports both descriptive and econometric evidence; finally, section (6) provides interpretations and concludes.
Italy's primary schooling: 1859 -1911
Italy's national primary school system was established by the Casati Law during the process of unification (1859) and later extended to the other regions that became part of the Kingdom. Under this system, education had to be offered free of chargeproportionally to the municipalities' spending capacity and according to their people's need. 2 The first-grade primary school (lasting two years) was mandatory, while secondgrade schools (two additional years) would only be set up in municipalities exceeding 4,000 inhabitants or in localities where high schools had already been established (cf.
Coccìa and Della Torre 2007).
Soon after the system was settled, the Ministry of Education began to collect data and reports on the state of primary schooling across the country's provinces. The first inquiry, published in 1865, confirmed the dramatic state of Italy's education that had been pointed out by the first census. A great deal of attention was paid to the role of teachers and to pedagogical aspects. The inquiry was coupled by a statistical publication, with plenty of data on the number and quality of teachers, schools, enrolments and actual attendance, public expenditure and salaries. This early account identified some of the major problems which would be addressed in the following decades. The most pressing issue was the presence of remarkable regional disparities in enrolments: only the North-Western provinces of Italy had Gross Enrolment Ratios (GER) 3 substantially larger than 50% in 1863 ( Figure 3 ).
2 This liberal approach was a result of the limited state budget, the predominant role of liberal parties and the widespread perception that private education would play a significant role in educating Italy's citizens. 3 GER is defined as the total of pupils enrolled as a share of pupils aged 6 -10 (it does not account for actual attendance). The inquiry blamed poverty and low living standards as the main factors behind the disappointing levels of attendance. The countryside was characterised by the widespread employment of child labour, especially during the summer. In some regions, children had to work for most of the year. 4 City councils played a negative role as well.
On the one hand, their balance sheets were constrained: investing in new infrastructures and enforcing compulsory education was costly. On the other hand, schooling was not perceived as a valuable investment. This was especially the case where schools had barely existed before the unification of the country -there where the clergy often saw state education as a factor of secularization. Therefore, the political party in power could easily lose preferences in future elections by promoting schooling.
Poor-quality teaching was another disappointing feature of the system. Yet, as many of the inspectors admitted, teachers could not really be blamed for that. The salary they earned would barely suffice for survival: they had to give private lessons in order to achieve a more decent standard of living. Furthermore, teaching methods were often obsolete: the inquiry witnessed that individual and mutual teaching 5 were still very much in fashion during the second half of the 19 th century.
The report concluded with some advices on how to improve the school system. Firstly, it strongly advised the government to strengthen the sanctions concerning the lack of attendance. Secondly, it put forward the idea to cluster different municipalities in consortia, partnerships that could be set up in order to share the burden of school building -a point that would be picked up by policy-makers only in the early 20 th century. Thirdly, the inquiry pointed out the need to provide economic support to the most disadvantaged municipalities. Fourthly, the condition of teachers had to be strongly improved, otherwise job insecurity and extremely low wages would continue to depress school enrolments. Finally, the need to boost the training of more qualified teachers through normal schools was underlined. The inquiry also put forward that private education would become more important over time and raise the country's educational attainments. However, enrolments in private schools represented roughly 13.6% of the total; this figure would soon decline, with private education ending up playing only a marginal role in Italy's system. 4 In regions like Tuscany the grain-harvesting during summer months was accompanied by grapeharvesting, olive-harvesting and chestnuts collection during the whole autumn. This basically left only a few months for schooling. 5 The individual method consisted in face-to-face interaction between the teacher and each student within the class. Mutual teaching meant the teacher instructed a group of students whom, in turn, would be able to teach the rest of the class.
A further inquiry into primary education was conducted in the years 1868 -1872 and discussed in deep by Gerolamo Buonazia, 6 the supervisor. He remarked those disappointing features that were widely known to depress the development of education. However, the report explored an aspect that had been previously neglected:
the poor quality of school buildings. Schools across the country were often overcrowded, dirty and insalubrious. They lacked the basic furniture and didactic material essential to attend classes fruitfully. In fact, low attendance was still a plague.
Most pupils would attend school just as far as they were too little to work -roughly from the age of seven to that of nine. Additionally, they often reverted to a state of illiteracy after they had complied with compulsory primary education. This was due to the fact that their literacy skills were never nourished beyond the time spent in classan interesting case of human capital depreciation. The teachers' average salary was still humble, sometimes quite miserable: the wage of non-qualified 7 rural teachers was often found to be below the minimum established by the Casati Law: 500 Lire for males and 333 for females ( Figure 5 ). Buonazia stressed the need to address these points by implementing new measures. He suggested introducing exams in order to release students from compulsory schoolingso that nobody with insufficient literacy would be allowed to quit. Additionally, the issue of quality teaching needed to be dealt with by increasing the number of normal schools and qualified teachers, as well as their salary. In fact, at the end of the 1860s more than 21% of teachers had no formal degree -which means they could not expect to earn much more than the minimum wage.
Although a good deal of attention was paid to the role of economic factors in explaining poor enrolment ratios and low attendance, the government kept on focusing on the enforcement of formal norms -not least because of political reasons and the pressure of liberal and catholic parties against a more robust intervention. In the policy-makers' opinion, the enforcement of compulsory education by the city councils needed to be more effective. Along these lines, a new bill draft was discussed soon after the publication of the Buonazia inquiry in 1873, but its approval was delayed by a few years.
In fact, the Casati Law was only amended in 1877, by the Coppino Law. This measure was passed in order to enforce compulsory attendance in the rural and most disadvantaged areas of the country. A third inquiry, still supervised by Buonazia, followed in 1878. The story told had not yet changed. Most of the schools were ineffective because of the grimy and decaying venues. They were poorly attended and teaching was rarely competent. Once more, the report suggested finding a way to push the municipalities to spend more on education and enforce the law on compulsory attendance. Another point is worth some attention: for the first time an official inquiry took a more robust stance towards the role of the state in the provision of basic education. In fact, it underlined that the government had always generously funded secondary schooling. Therefore -Buonazia suggested -a share of these resources could be redirected to fund primary schooling, so that issues brought about by economic disparities could be addressed more effectively.
The Torraca inquiry, published in 1897, witnessed the state of primary schooling twenty years after the Coppino Law was passed. This provided very picturesque reports on the state of Italy's schools. The inspector from Campobasso claimed that 60.65% of the school in the district were sub-optimal, while 69% of the furniture and didactic material was deemed to be barely sufficient or insufficient. The report on Oristano portrayed schools as "narrow and unhygienic hovels with no roof and dirt-patched and muddy floors, characterised by unhinged, broken-glass windows". Reports from
Sanremo, Melfi and Avellino described schools with no toilets. The inspector from Susa found some schools set up into stables, where "the noise of animals -oxen, donkeys, sheep, chickens etc. -was a continuous source of distraction". According to this account, these conditions were difficult to improve: in fact, local politicians would just claim that the children were not at all affected by this kind of environment -just because they had always been taught in that way. The inspector from Vasto described "miserable and dirty rooms that lacked air and light, and which were dripping moisture". The report by an inspector from Gaeta sheds light on the reasons why schools were often called 'killer schools': "many [children] had their head covered by vivid and purulent sores, which stench infected the air: I made sure they would leave me alone". Very often administrative inefficiencies were also spotted. Sometimes the schools were established in leased buildings. Yet, these contracts were not aimed to save money. Instead, local elites normally forced the city councils to pay a rent higher than the market price in order to establish a school in friends' or acquaintances' venues -so they could reinforce and strengthen their patronage network.
Thus, Torraca called for a new law in order to make school building more widespread, so that the use of leasing contracts would be reduced. However, the bureaucracy concerning the requests for mortgages and subsidies also needed to be simplified. In fact, the applications took normally two years or more to be revised and approved.
As a matter of fact, on the eve of the 20 th century state intervention became to be seen as the only viable solution to the problem of Italy's primary education. Enrolments in private schools had dropped to 7.3% of the total, and the Torraca inquiry had just
shown that the quality of teaching in private institutions was quite poor. 8 Moreover, a demand-side shift was very unlikely to improve educational attainments or to reduce regional disparities in schooling. In fact, the first wave of income growth affected mainly In a nutshell, these interventions were aimed to improve the condition of teachers and to promote school buildings in the most backward regions. A decisive step was taken when the Corradini inquiry was published in 1910. This represented another effort to explore and understand the causes of Italy's sluggish performance in primary education.
Although the report largely confirmed what other studies had already revealed, this work had a central political role in promoting and accelerating the process that led to centralized primary education -so much that the new bill, which would be approved soon thereafter, was often called the Corradini Law within political circles (Cives 1990 -something similar to the consortia that the inquiry published in 1865 had proposed.
The Consiglio was redesigned to manage the resources destined to primary education and hire the teachers. It allowed a great deal of administrative decentralization that largely limited the power of the city councils. Yet, the system became financially far more centralized than it had ever been: the state was fully committed to pay the teachers' salary. By contrast, school-building was still largely managed by the municipalities, although they could apply for interest-free state loans. According to the bill, the municipalities' resources had to be consolidated and paid to the Treasury (art.
17). The government would then redistribute the funds to the provinces (art. 19), which in turn would finance education (art. 20). It is worth noting that provincial capitals and other major administrative centres were excluded from the CSP system. Yet, every city could formally apply to be included in (or excluded from) its relative CSP within three years after the reform was approved. As Figure 6 shows, municipalities belonging to the North of Italy largely retained their autonomy. 
Methodology
Since this paper aims to understand whether decentralized primary schooling hampered the supply of education across Italy's regions (and whether the DaneoCredaro reform changed this mechanism in 1911) it does not focus on output measures of human capital. This approach is twofold: on the one hand, the analysis can be focused on schooling -on which the reform likely had more immediate effects. On the other hand, this is likely to scale down problems of endogeneity, which are more likely to rise by regressing output measures on the municipalities' available resources. Therefore, the role of decentralized and centralized primary education is assessed by looking at:
(1) the number of schools per 1,000 pupils subject to compulsory schooling; 10 (2) Gross Enrolment Ratios; (3) the ratio between the number of pupils subject to compulsory schooling and the teachers employed. These indices provide a comprehensive picture of Italy's supply of schooling by the government sector. 11 Taking into account more than one index is crucial, because the Daneo-Credaro reform had different effects on different dimensions of schooling.
The econometric model used in this paper follows Clay, Lingwall and Stephens (2012) and draws largely from Gujarati and Porter (2003) . Firstly, it tests whether the municipalities' spending capacity ( ) explains the variation in the supply of schooling ( ) across Italy's regions. If a strong relationship between the municipalities' spending capacity and the supply of schooling really existed, the sign of 10 The pupils subject to compulsory primary education are estimated by considering the age class 6 -10 for Italy's Liberal age (1861 -1921) in order to allow a diachronic analysis -as the age for compulsory schooling grew from two years to four or six (depending on the curriculum) during the period. Instead, for the Fascist period the number of pupils subject to compulsory education is directly drawn from the inquiries and statistics, and refers to the age class 6 -14, introduced by the Gentile reform in 1923. The choice of using pupils aged 6 -10 instead of population as a denominator for indices is justified by the fact that different Italian regions might have been characterized by a different demographic structure, like a different share of young people on total -which seems to be suggested by data analysis. 11 Although private education played some role in the early stage of Italy's development, its share declined quickly over time. Additionally, private schooling was marginally affected by the major reforms that led to centralization -hence it will not be taken into account.
this coefficient is expected to be positive (schools per 1,000 pupils and GER) or negative (pupils-to-teacher ratio) according to the index of schooling employed. The value of the coefficient should be large and statistically significant, and it should not be affected by changes in the specification of the model (Equation 1):
(1)
Secondly, the role of the Daneo-Credaro reform is assessed by including a dummy 
If the Daneo-Credaro reform was really effective will show the opposite sign of (which means the reform reduced the role of the municipalities' spending capacity). The effectiveness of centralization depends on the magnitude of . The closer it is to , the more effective the reform was in reducing the effect of regional economic disparities on the given measure of schooling.
The specification adopted is based on longitudinal data: the panel structure can be used in order to control for geographical and unobservable features by using regional timeinvariant Fixed Effects or Random Effects. Other specifications of the baseline model implement a variety of controls in order to reduce potential omitted variable bias.
Sources and data
The data and evidence used in this work are drawn from different and largely had not yet been estimated, so they were calculated by following the methodology applied by Zamagni (1987) and Felice (2011). 14 The 1881 figure is drawn 12 A more detailed and comprehensive list of primary sources can be found in the references. 13 Revenues included property rents, taxes from various sources, over-taxes on land and consumption and "other incomes". 14 Fenoaltea has followed a different procedure concerning the number of workers in the textile industry in order to estimate industrial value added. However, the methodology applied by Zamagni and Felice from Zamagni, while data for successive benchmark years are collected from Felice (2009 ( ) and SVIMEZ (2011 .
The second main control variable is included in order to deal with a potential problem underlying data on the municipalities' revenues. The city councils were allowed to establish over-taxes in order to fund investments in public goods that, according to the law, had to be provided at the municipal level. The problem arises since the amount of resources they actually extracted via over-taxes was highly discretionary. In fact, and Vecchi rely on a comparison between over-tax revenues from land and over-tax revenues due on consumption. According to authors, the larger share of income due to land over-taxes in Northern regions means that governing elites were more willing to tax themselves in order to provide mass education and widely accessible public goods.
Although this proxy is conceptually sound, the index used is flowed: Italy's cadastre (catasto) was not harmonized across different regions until the mid-20 th century. Thus, comparing over-tax revenues from land (inherently different across regions) with should be more suitable in this context. In fact, their estimates rely on industrial censuses, and therefore they are preferred in order to understand the extent of industrialization across Italy's regions. The two different methodologies are described in Fenoaltea (2001) and Zamagni (1987) respectively.
overt-tax revenues due on consumption (which system was more homogeneous across regions) does not necessarily capture what A'Hearn, Auria and Vecchi are trying to observe, and leads to a bias.
In order to take this alternative hypothesis into account, an index of political preference toward investments in human capital is taken into account -the expenditure on education as a share of the municipalities' available resources. An alternative, new index following A'Hearn, Auria and Vecchi is also elaborated: the share of all over-taxes collected by municipalities (not only on land, but also consumption duties) on their total revenues. This approach largely scales down the bias due to heterogeneous cadastres, and highlights whether different municipalities belonging to different regions had alternative preferences toward investments in education. Section (5) presents the results.
Overall, the analysis is developed by focusing on the benchmark years for which data on schooling were fully available, i.e. 1863, 1870, 1877, 1884, 1895, 1907, 1912, 1921, 1928, 1930 and 1935 . Financial figures and data on control variables were normally available in neighbouring years -although few of these had to be re-aligned to the figures on schooling by means of linear interpolation. The complete panel is made up of 16 to 18 regions (depending on the period, as the number grew in the Interwar years) and 11 benchmark years -six before the Daneo-Credaro was passed and five afterwards.
Evidence and results
This section presents descriptive evidence on the existence of a human capital trap across Italy's regions and on the effects of the Daneo-Credaro reform after 1911. The analysis is based on figures regarding the municipalities' balance sheets and primary schooling. Figure 7 plots an index of the municipalities' total available resources in 1870 and 1928: data from the municipalities are aggregated by region and divided by the respective population. The municipalities' spending capacity differed considerably across regions, with no sign of convergence over the long-run. In fact, an index of sigmaconvergence developed following Williamson (1965) The scatter plot in Figure 8 shows that the municipalities' spending capacity was by no means correlated with -let alone determined by -the councils' political will to invest in education, as A'Hearn, Auria and Vecchi (2011) put forward. The expenditure on education as a share of total ordinary revenues is very weekly correlated to the municipalities' per capita revenues over the whole panel, with ρ equal to -0.08. 15 The index is calculated as: √∑ ( ⁄ ) ⁄ where denotes the index concerned and the population for a given region (i) and for Italy (m). Figure 9 suggests that the share of ordinary revenues collected thanks to over-taxes is also weekly correlated with the municipalities' spending capacity, with ρ equal to 0.24 for the whole panel. All in all, this evidence implies that public resources were not highly dependent on the political will of ruling elites. These certainly retained a role, but the most prominent factor in determining the extent to which municipalities could invest in public goods and schooling was their relative wealth and economic progress. The descriptive evidence provided suggests the validity of both hypotheses put forward.
Decentralized primary education was likely to hamper convergence in schooling as it locked Italy's regions in a human capital trap, because of large wealth and income disparities. The results of centralization are very much discernible in the municipalities' balance sheets. Yet, the effects on the actual supply of education need to be further explored. Figure 12 displays the number of state schools per 1,000 pupils subject to primary education in 1877, 1907 and 1930 . The first row of Table 2 reports the pattern of regional sigma-convergence. There is no sign of a marked discontinuity after 1911 -overall convergence seems to follow a linear trend throughout the whole period. This is quite consistent with the fact that school building and maintenance was still managed by the city councils, hence economic disparities retained a role and might have The Gross Enrolment Ratio (GER) seems to underline a similar trend (Figure 13 ). The convergence of Central regions might have been largely due to the fact that that the North-West had already reached a steady-state in the late 19 th century (its GER oscillating around 1.00). In spite of this catch-up potential the Southern regions converged slowly, as the index of sigma-convergence suggests (second row of Table 2 ). Table 2 ). To sum up, the evidence on schooling confirms the preliminary findings obtained by exploring the municipalities' balance sheets. Decentralized primary education slowed down regional convergence in the supply of teachers. It was also likely to inhibit convergence in the number of schools and enrolments. In fact, although the indices concerning the number of schools and enrolments points out convergence throughout the whole period, a great deal of the pre-1911 catch-up could be the result of a marked acceleration between 1895 and 1907, when the state had already begun to invest more on education -as outlined in section (2). Finally, it is worth noting that sigmaconvergence captures the extent to which the dispersion around the mean changed, but it does not identify the mechanisms behind it.
The econometric model described in section (3) offers further insights into the patterns observed. Table 3 The dummy for centralization is also significant and has the correct sign independently of the index of schooling considered. Additionally, its effect seems to be large: an observation in the post-1911 period has a premium of 9 schools per 1,000 pupils, +42.8% of enrolments and 68.49 fewer pupils per teacher. The interaction term is significant and large: it basically offsets the effect of economic resources in the case of enrolments and pupils per teacher -while it reduces the marginal effect of the municipalities' spending capacity on schools to a lesser extent. All in all, these results
show that the Daneo-Credaro reform largely weakened Italy's human capital trap and that, although schooling did grow in the post-1911 period, this pattern is not explained by the municipalities' spending capacity.
The results must prove to be robust with regard to the inclusion of specific control variables. Regional (time-invariant) Fixed Effects (FE) 16 are introduced in order to control for geographical differences and other potentially unobserved factors that are constant over time. Expenditure on education as a share of total available resources is used as a proxy for the municipalities' different political will to invest in public goods, as sketched in section (4). The opportunity cost of education is proxied by the share of labour force employed in agriculture. The same model includes a dummy to capture the effect of decreased birth rates during the Great War, 17 while a proxy for urban population density is used in order to capture the effect of agglomeration on the supply 16 The Hausman test -normally conducted in order to choose between Fixed (FE) and Random Effects (RE) models -could not be performed, as the specification failed to meet the asymptotic assumptions required. Given that, a FE model was chosen to provide consistent estimates. It is also worth stressing that, for this particular specification, FE and RE basically led to the same results. 17 The dummy is equal to 1 if pupils subject to compulsory schooling in a given year were born in 1915 -1918. of schools and teachers. 18 The specification adopted does not include Time Fixed Effects.
The reason is that the relevant time dimension should be captured effectively by the reform dummy and by its interaction with the observations concerning the municipalities' resources. Table 4 reports the results based on this augmented specification.
(1) Table 3 : Regression output with different schooling indicators (pooled data), 1862 -1936. 18 This control variable has been elaborated for each region according to the information contained in the censuses. However, these do not report urbanization rates; instead, they focus on a measure of agglomeration. Unfortunately, these publications often classify very small villages as "centres", so that the proxy used might be highly biased at the source.
(1) (2) The core results turn out to be robust to the inclusion of regional Fixed Effects and of other control variables. The role of institutional features remains unclear: in fact, the proxy for the municipalities' political will to invest a larger share of economic resources in education is significant only in the case of pupils-to-teacher ratio: an increase of 1% in the share would reduce the number of pupils per teacher by 1.47. This result is likely to capture the ability to enforce compulsory education, hire qualified teachers and solve coordination problems linked to misaligned incentives. In fact, the reports by the inspectors of primary education pointed out the role of city councils in the promotion of schooling among citizens. In particular, the enforcement of compulsory schooling was seen as a crucial matter -together with the capability to establish fruitful agreements between the households and the schools. Very often (and especially in rural communities) parents 30 would not easily allow their children to attend schools. By contrast, the schools had to enforce the rules on compulsory attendance. This was a pressing problem during the harvesting months when agricultural activities would largely depress school attendance.
Therefore, some city councils proposed innovative solutions. In some rural centres of the provinces of La Spezia and Alessandria, for example, pupils attended schools for a very limited amount of hours so they could also work with their parents. Similar experiences in other areas are assumed to be quite common, although it remains unclear how widespread these arrangements exactly were.
The proxy for the opportunity cost of education has not proved to be significant. Probably, the main reason behind this result is that this factor is more likely to impact on measures of human capital other than the supply of schooling. It might also be a simple matter of measurement -a scatter plot suggests that a negative relationship actually exists, but it might be weakly identified. Finally, the effects of the Great War on birth rates are discernible -although the statistical significance of the variable remains weak. Although the results on the role of centralization appear to be robust, no firm conclusion has yet been reached about regional convergence in primary education. In fact, the sigmaconvergence observed in Table 2 highlights what it seems to be a long-term linear trend in the number of schools available and gross enrolments, while the Daneo-Credaro reform likely had more substantial effects as far as the supply of teachers is concerned. As it has been previously noted, the pattern of sigma-convergence observed may actually depend on reduced dispersion within a given group of regions, rather than between the North and the South -and it might be driven by the North-Eastern and Central regions of the country, as the maps presented by this section suggested. Therefore, the econometric model previously adopted has been modified to identify the existence of diverse trends in the data -one for the country as a whole, one for North-Western regions and one for the South. In order to do so, time dummies are introduced in order to capture a given trend, and interacted with the municipalities' spending capacity ( 
Interpretations and conclusions
The problem of Italy's regional disparities is more pressing today than ever before. The long-term persistence and the widening of regional inequalities after the recent financial and economic downturn calls for a better understanding of their causes. This research focuses on the education system and on its influence on regional disparities in human capital, largely inherited from pre-unification states. It argues that decentralized primary Finally, the present research has shown that regional convergence remained largely incomplete on the eve of World War II. Yet, this pattern was not caused by the disappointing performance of Southern regions in response to centralization. Instead, estimated regional trends suggest that the Daneo-Credaro reform boosted education both in the North and the South of the country, possibly because of the large impact it had in rural areas -which helped overcoming bottlenecks due to grassroots efforts to supply schooling. Therefore, the idea of convergence might not be the most suitable category to evaluate the results of the Daneo-Credaro reform during the Interwar period.
More in-depth research on this topic is needed, especially to gain a better understanding of the role of local institutions -only briefly taken into account by this work. These might have persisted well beyond 1911 and might have even influenced the way centralization was actually implemented in different areas. The issue of regional disparities remains central in Italy's economic history and in today's public policy. This paper suggests that, although a decentralized administrative system can theoretically provide good incentives in promoting economic activity and enhance the meeting of supply and demand, it also conceals undeniable dangers.
